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“A central thesis then begins to emerge: man is in his actions and practice, as well 
as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal.” (Alasdair MacIntyre, After 
Virtue)1 
 
“Moral value, as should be obvious, is not separable from other values. An adequate 
morality would be ecologically sound; it would be esthetically pleasing. But the 
point I want to stress here is that it would be practical. Morality is long term 
practicality […]. Morality is neither ethereal nor arbitrary; it is the definition of 
what is humanly possible, and it is the definition of the penalties for violating 
human possibility. A person who violates human limits is punished or he prepares 
a punishment for his successors, not necessarily because of any divine or human 
law, but because he has transgressed the order of things.” (Wendell Berry, 
“Discipline and Hope”)2 
 
Last fall 2018, when I was a scholar in residence at Duke University Divinity School, I taught a 
course in theological ethics called “Illness, Suffering, and the Witness of the Church.” On the first 
day of class I projected Pieter Brueghel’s “Landscape with the Fall of Icarus” onto the screen in 
the front of the room and asked the students to say what they saw, and what the painting might 
have to do with illness and suffering. After several minutes of fruitful conversation, we read 
together W. H. Auden’s poem, “Musée des Beaux Arts,”3 which narrates Brueghel’s painting and 
sets that narration within a broader reflection on the ways we attend or fail to attend to the suffering 
of others. More than thirty minutes later, I reluctantly cut the conversation short and moved on. 
Although that conversation (and indeed, that entire course) was unusually fruitful, my approach 
to teaching it was far from novel. For example, in the undergraduate bioethics course I teach 
regularly, we discuss biotechnology and medicalization by reading Gerald McKenny’s essay 
“Bioethics, the Body, and the Legacy of Bacon”4 and Martin Heidegger’s “The Question 
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Concerning Technology,”5 but we also attend to Nathaniel Hawthorne’s short story “The 
Birthmark.”6 When we address death and dying and the moral questions where medicine intersects 
with the end of life, we study the origins and development of distinctions between proportionate 
and disproportionate care and those between killing and allowing to die, while also reading 
Wendell Berry’s short story “Fidelity,”7 Leo Tolstoy’s “The Death of Ivan Ilyich,”8 and poetry by 
Jane Kenyon, Vassar Miller, and others.9  
These are only two examples of courses where I employ literature and visual art to teach ethics, 
something I’ve done in most of my courses since I started teaching more than twenty years ago. I 
like to think I learned to do this from Alasdair MacIntyre, both by reading his work, which is 
replete with references to and examples from literature, and by following the example of those 
teachers of mine who were most influenced by MacIntyre.10 In what follows, I want to begin to 
develop an account of why I think MacIntyre is correct in claiming that “morally serious” academic 
courses in ethics ought to include a close reading of certain kinds of literature.11 My account will 
be based on my regard for three important strands of MacIntyre’s work: first, his insistence that 
every ethic presupposes a sociology, which is to say, a particular set of normative social 
arrangements; second, the emphasis in his work on the significance of exemplars, practices, and 
apprenticeship in moral formation; and third, his longstanding attention to the significance of 
narrative in human life. I will conclude, finally, by attending to a particular example of the kind of 
literature I think MacIntyre has in mind, suggesting the kind of difference it might make for 
teaching ethics. 
 
1. Every Ethic Presumes a Sociology 
In a lecture delivered toward the end of her life, the writer Flannery O’Connor remarked to her 
audience that “[s]omewhere is better than anywhere.”12 O’Connor, whose novels and stories are 
characterized by meticulous attention to the particularities of the places and cultures—the 
“somewheres”—where they take place, understood not only that life necessarily unfolds and is 
lived out in particular places among particular others, but that personal identity is necessarily 
placed: “The things we see, hear, smell and touch affect us,” she claimed, “long before we believe 
anything at all.”13 To presume or pretend otherwise is to become lost in abstraction. Just so, her 
observation about the members of a literary gathering she had been invited to speak to, namely, 
that “[m]ost of them live in a world God never made,” was not a compliment.14 
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Although she may have found its academic pitch off-putting, O’Connor would likely have 
understood MacIntyre’s claim in After Virtue that 
 
[a] moral philosophy […] characteristically presupposes a sociology. For every 
moral philosophy offers explicitly or implicitly at least a partial conceptual analysis 
of the relationship of an agent to his or her reasons, motives, intentions, and actions, 
and in so doing generally presupposes some claim that these concepts are embodied 
or at least can be in the real social world.15 
 
MacIntyre’s insistence upon the social embeddedness of moral agents and the necessity of 
attending to the particularities of that embeddedness is one of the bases of his ongoing 
disagreement with modern moral and political philosophy, especially in its academic guise. For 
not only has modern moral philosophy become, like most other academic disciplines, highly 
specialized and esoteric, it has also adopted an account of moral agency that is largely divorced 
from the realities of everyday life and “the everyday questions of plain persons.”16 
In Ethics and the Conflicts of Modernity, MacIntyre labels the subject matter of modern moral 
philosophy “Morality,” which he characterizes as “a set of impersonal rules, entitled to the assent 
of any rational agent whatsoever.”17 Morality is the ethic of anywhere, held by its proponents to 
be distinct from and superior to every particular contextual morality. Its precepts are purportedly 
perspicuous to rational agents, irrespective of those agents’ dispositions or social contexts.18 
Further, the precepts of Morality are part of a tightly circumscribed discourse, divorced from the 
spheres of faith, politics, art, economics, and law.19 MacIntyre’s argument with Morality is not 
simply that it is founded on a series of fictions, but that its claim to be universally binding on every 
rational agent obscures that it is in fact the morality of late capitalist modernity.20 More 
specifically, it is the morality or ethics of “the state-and-the-market,” which functions largely to 
underwrite existing distributions of power and wealth within the modern capitalist nation-state.21 
Real moral agents are, of course, not at all like those presupposed by Morality. As MacIntyre 
insists, the various relationships and roles moral agents occupy and the dispositions they have 
developed in and through those relationships and roles are constitutive of, rather than incidental 
to, their practical moral reasoning.22 In contrasting the practical reasoning of Morality to that of 
the Thomistic Aristotelianism he embraces, MacIntyre asserts that one fairly stark difference 
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between the two is the former’s concern with managing the competing interests of agents who seek 
to maximize the satisfaction of their individual preferences, over against the latter’s concern to 
form agents who recognize that their own interests include the goods they hold in common with 
those particular others with whom they share a life.23 Judgments concerning the actions of such 
agents, he says, necessarily account for their particular social roles and presuppose “a narrative 
understanding of both individual agents and institutions,” which is to say that “it is only in the 
contexts supplied by background narratives that particular actions and courses of action can be 
adequately understood and evaluated.”24 
Accordingly, a deep disagreement exists between MacIntyre’s position, which insists upon the 
importance of “background narratives,” and that of “anyone whose evaluative and normative 
judgments are independent of and incompatible with any narrative presuppositions whatsoever, as 
is the case with judgments made from the standpoint of Morality.”25 And here we are brought back 
to the indispensability of reading certain kinds of literature in the “morally serious” teaching of 
academic courses in ethics.26 These are narratives that unfold in particular, historied, 
“somewheres.” They are populated by morally complex characters—virtuous, vicious, and 
morally ambiguous—who are embedded in relationships and social roles that are constitutive of, 
rather than incidental to, their identities and agencies. These are stories that instantiate the 
inseparability of ethics and sociology by showing the inescapable sociality of their characters. 
 
2. Exemplars, Practices, and Apprenticeship 
It is arguably a truism to say that our identity and character are formed socially; all of us, all the 
time, are per hap or per force becoming one kind of person rather than another by virtue of our 
relationships with people and institutions, whether or not we are aware of this becoming. Yet we 
sometimes fail to see just how foundational certain relationships are. Rowan Williams, the former 
Archbishop of Canterbury, writes about this with regard to becoming a person of faith: 
 
It starts from a sense that we “believe in,” we trust some kinds of people. We have 
confidence in the way they live; the way they live is the way I want to live, perhaps 
can imagine myself living in my better or more mature moments. The world they 
inhabit is one I’d like to live in. Faith has a lot to do with the simple fact that there 
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are trustworthy lives to be seen, that we can see in some believing people a world 
we’d like to live in.27 
 
What is true of coming to faith is likewise true of the formation of character. Much in the same 
way we become relatively capable users of language before we every study grammar, we come to 
know a good deal about better and worse ways to live before we ever study ethics.28 This knowing 
is a product of our seeing and being part of the exemplary lives of others, women and men who 
have learned to be good at being human and are recognized as such by their communities.29 In her 
2017 book Exemplarist Moral Theory, Linda Zagzebski suggests that exemplars are foundational, 
not just for the way we live, but for the language we use to describe moral excellence and evaluate 
our actions and the actions of others; our moral language is “anchored in” exemplars of moral 
goodness. We identify lives as exemplary not because they satisfy predetermined criteria, she says, 
but because they elicit in us the emotion of admiration, which is developed through “the telling 
and retelling of narratives.”30 Parents, teachers, and others, themselves potential exemplars, are 
frequently tellers of stories populated by other exemplars. 
Exemplars, Zagzebski says, “not only show us what morality is, but they make us want to be 
moral and show us how to do it.”31 Learning from exemplars how to be moral is not simply a 
matter of being affected by them, or even of imitating their discrete actions, but also of coming to 
understand why certain actions are called for in certain situations and not in others, and why, which 
is to say that we learn from them something of the art of practical moral reasoning. Here we may 
return to MacIntyre, who has argued that moral enquiry presupposes a commitment to becoming 
a certain kind of person who reasons in a particular way, which entails “making oneself into an 
apprentice to a craft, the craft in this case that of philosophical enquiry.”32 The process of 
apprenticeship begins with the imitation of a master and progresses toward an understanding of 
how and why the master does what she does when she does it. This entails that the apprentice 
develops self-understanding, including the ability to recognize his or her mistakes and limitations, 
“to identify what it is about him or herself that needs to be transformed, that is, what vices need to 
be eradicated, what intellectual and moral virtues need to be cultivated.”33 
Among the things the apprentice comes to understand as her learning progresses is that both 
she and her teacher are part of a particular history. “To share in the rationality of a craft requires 
sharing in the contingencies of its history, understanding its story as one’s own, and finding a place 
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for oneself as a character in the enacted dramatic narrative which is that story so far.”34 Where 
moral formation is concerned, these narratives may be literary, introducing the apprentice to the 
kinds of exemplary characters whose lives are accessible to her only through literary narratives. 
Literary narratives grant hearers and readers access to the consciousness of their characters, and 
the way they deliberate about what to do in particular circumstances given who they are and who 
they aspire to become.35 
 
3. The Significance of Narrative  
MacIntyre’s considerable regard for narrative as an important category in moral philosophy 
follows from his and others’ observations and convictions about the narrative character of human 
existence: our faculty with symbolic language renders us capable of telling stories, which make 
possible and shape our common lives as political animals.36 As MacIntyre writes: “man is in his 
actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal.”37 We depend on 
and use narratives in at least three intertwined ways: (1) they enable us to make sense of the things 
going on around us at given times in particular places; (2) they allow us make sense of our lives 
as historied beings whose stories are part of and dependent on the stories of particular others; and 
(3) they help us make sense of the world by orienting us toward the pursuit of particular ends and 
showing how those ends may best be achieved. 
MacIntyre argues in After Virtue that the proper identification of a given human action demands 
or presupposes attention to context in two ways: actions are rendered intelligible only as the agent’s 
intentions are located (1) within that agent’s history, and (2) within the history of the setting where 
the action is performed. To attend to the context of human actions in this way is to narrate them as 
part of a history, which leads MacIntyre to assert that “[n]arrative history of a certain kind turns 
out to be the basic and essential genre for the characterization of human actions.”38 
Importantly, narrative is not something superimposed on actions to render them intelligible, but 
something characteristic of actions in themselves. “Narrative is not the work of poets, dramatists, 
and novelists reflecting upon events which had no narrative order before one was imposed by the 
singer or the writer; narrative form is neither disguise or decoration.”39 Instead, narrative “works” 
as a mode of characterizing the actions of others because human lives are lived narratives.40 
To say that a human life is a lived narrative, with a beginning, a middle, and an end, is to say 
that we are not simply actors in our life stories, but the authors of those stories, as well. Our 
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authorship is limited, however, by the fact that our lives, and so our stories, are from the beginning 
part of a constellation of other lives and stories. We are “born with a past” that remains part of our 
stories; like all characters in dramatic narratives, we “never start literally ab initio,” but “plunge in 
media res,” for our stories have in a sense already begun without us.41 Just so, our lives are 
circumscribed by the fact that “we are never more (and sometimes less) than the co-authors of our 
own stories. Only in fantasy do we live the life we please.”42 
Not only do our stories begin without us, they point as well toward imagined futures shaped 
and shared by the stories of those whose lives intersect with our own.43 Those futures, which give 
our lives and stories a teleological character, may be inspired by certain “bigger” stories that 
connect us not simply to those whose lives directly intersect with our own, but to others whose 
lives have also been shaped by these stories. Such stories become over time partly constitutive of 
moral traditions; MacIntyre describes a tradition as “an historically extended, socially embodied 
argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition.”44 
Insofar as “the individual’s search for his or her own good is generally and characteristically 
conducted with a context defined by a context defined by those traditions of which the individual’s 
life is a part,” these stories may come to have a kind of canonical status.45 They suggest the 
existence of ultimate or final human ends that inform the actions of agents who aspire to lives that 
can be characterized as good.46 As often as not, these stories are representative of certain kinds of 
literature. 
 
4. “Certain Kinds”: Wendell Berry and His Stories of the Port William Membership 
At the conclusion of each of the three parts of this essay, I have returned to MacIntyre’s insistence 
on the importance of reading certain kinds of literature in the teaching of ethics. (He says novels, 
but I have taken the liberty of also considering short stories and narrative poetry.) But what 
characterizes such “certain kinds”? Rather than try to answer this question in the abstract, I will 
turn to a particular example, namely, the fiction of the American poet, essayist, ecological activist, 
and social critic, Wendell Berry. Berry’s work is exemplary in part because it implicates each of 
the three points I have tried to make in defending MacIntyre’s claim about the importance of 
literature. Perhaps more importantly, it is exemplary because, as Stanley Hauerwas says, “I often 
think that Berry’s novels do what is next to impossible in our time, and that is make goodness 
compelling.”47 
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Berry, who is now eighty-five years old, lives and works near the Kentucky town where he was 
born and raised, on a working farm on the Kentucky River near its confluence with the Ohio. He 
has not always lived there; he earned undergraduate and graduate degrees in English literature at 
the University of Kentucky, he was a Wallace Stegner Writing Fellow at Stanford University, and 
he was a member of the English faculty at NYU. His move back to Kentucky in the mid-1960s 
and his gradual return to farming became determinative for his writing; nearly all of his fiction, 
both novels and short stories, is set in an imagined Kentucky farming village called Port William 
and is populated by a transgenerational cast of characters who think and speak of themselves as 
“the membership.” 
The notion of membership is essential to Berry’s fiction. The Port William membership is 
neither exclusive nor insular; it exists and is sustained by the mutual awareness of a common life 
built upon a variety of reciprocal obligations to people and place. Those obligations are sustained 
by the membership’s love for one another and for the land to which they mutually belong.48 As 
one of the membership’s pillars remarks, “The way we are, we are members of each other. All of 
us. Everything. The difference ain’t in who is a member and who is not, but in who knows it and 
who don’t.”49 The historian Eric Miller captures this ethos especially well: 
 
Far from an exclusive circle, membership in Port William comes to mean exactly 
the opposite: the grateful inclusion of any who live in devotion to the wellbeing of 
the town and its environs. The membership isn’t self-appointed. But it is self-
identifying. Those who are devoted to the place recognize one another by their 
mutual inclinations and sacrificial practices.50 
 
Port William is no utopia, and its membership is far from perfect. The town’s barber, Jayber Crow, 
ends his “memoir” by declaring: 
 
This is […] a book about Heaven, but I must say to that it has been a close call. For 
I have wondered sometimes if it would not finally turn out to be a book about Hell—
where we fail to love one another, where we hate and destroy one another for 
reasons abundantly provided or for righteousness’ sake or for pleasure, where we 
destroy the things we need most, where we see no hope and have no faith.51 
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The membership’s history includes all manner of conflict and viciousness. One of the appeals of 
Berry’s fiction is the pathos attending the failures of and conflicts among its characters, as well as 
its ability to elicit admiration when they reconcile and move forward—or when they simply move 
forward. 
As Port William’s story unfolds into the late Twentieth Century, its economy disintegrates, its 
young move away, and its pillars begin to die, the tone of the stories turns deeply elegiac. But it is 
never despairing, for the membership endures, in large part because its existence is not solely 
dependent on the virtue of any one of its living members. It is sustained by hope, and that hope is 
born of constancy, both experienced and remembered. As the protagonist of Berry’s eponymous 
novel Hannah Coulter says, “The membership includes the dead.”52 Telling and retelling stories 
of exemplary dead members is essential to the membership’s ongoing life, as well as its connection 
to the life to come.53 One of the membership recalls his father, not simply as his father, but as one 
of the membership: 
 
In such wanderings and encounters, my father enacted his belonging to his country 
and his people. He could be as peremptory and as harsh as a saw—we younger ones 
had all felt his edge—but he knew how to be a friend. One night when he was old, 
he named over to me all those of the dead who had been his friends. He said, “If 
they are there, Paradise is Paradise indeed.”54 
 
Thus for Berry’s membership, the final good of human life is given and pursued in and through 
the many proximal goods that constitute their common life. As Hannah Coulter explains, “And it 
is by the place we’ve got, and our love for it and our keeping of it, that this world is joined to 
Heaven.”55 Even Heaven turns out to be a somewhere. Consider in this regard Berry’s poem “A 
Meeting”: 
In a dream I meet 
my dead friend. He has, 
I know, gone long and far, 
and yet he is the same 
for the dead are changeless. 
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They grow no older. 
It is I who have changed, 
grown strange to what I was. 
Yet I, the changed one, 
ask: “How you been?” 
He grins and looks at me. 
“I been eating peaches 
off some mighty fine trees.”56 
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